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ABSTRACT 
This paper compares the impact of retail price discrimination and uniform pricing on 
a monopolist’s incentives to extend its Next Generation Access (NGA) network 
deployment to less densely populated geographic areas. It is found that geographic 
price discrimination provides the monopolist with higher incentives to deploy a larger 
NGA network. In addition, geographic price discrimination results in better welfare 
outcomes than uniform pricing as long as the investment cost is not extremely low. In 
such cases, the regulator should allow the monopolist to geographically price 
discriminate since the monopolist chooses the socially optimal pricing regime. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last decade, the number of Internet users, as well as, the capacity they 
demand have increased spectacularly. As a result, the increasing transmitted volume 
of data has made the traditional access copper networks incapable of providing end-
users with the demanded bandwidth. On the contrary, access networks based on 
optical fibre are the only future proof solution capable to satisfy the future demand 
(Shumate, 2008) since the transmission capabilities of fibre are theoretically unlimited 
providing high data rates, low loss and low distortion. Such fibre-based access 
networks are widely known as Next Generation Access (NGA) networks. 
Not only technical reasons but also economic ones make the need for investments in 
NGA networks imperative. In particular, it is found that investments in broadband 
infrastructures have an undisputable positive effect on economic growth, broadband 
diffusion and job creation (Czernich et al., 2011; ITU, 2012). These results partially 
interpret why national governments rank among their top priorities the encouragement 
of investments in NGA networks. 
Nevertheless, a number of features of NGA networks make investments principally 
challenging. Demand uncertainty is particularly problematic because of the substantial 
sunk investment cost. In addition, there has been an ongoing discussion on the 
outcomes of potential regulatory intervention, especially with regard to its impact on 
investment and competition outcomes. According to several studies 
(Charalampopoulos et al., 2011; Nitsche and Wiethaus, 2011), permanent or 
temporary absence of access regulation (regulatory forbearance or holidays, 
respectively) appear superior to other regulatory regimes in terms of both NGA 
investment level and the timing of investments, although they result in ambiguous 
outcomes in terms of social welfare.  
Recently, there has also been a growing discussion supporting regulatory forbearance 
in certain geographic areas as a means of stimulating NGA investments (ERG, 2008). 
This could lead to geographic de-averaging of prices that would reflect the geographic 
variances in market conditions, which may significantly differ from traditional 
PSTN/DSL conditions. Indeed, after a period of obligation of non-discrimination (EU, 
2002), currently, price discrimination is allowed to a certain (at least wholesale) 
extent related to NGA networks in Europe in order to foster innovation and welfare 
growth by promoting investments (EC, 2010). Thus, there may be a case for designing 
remedies that can vary across geographic markets that would be defined as locations 
with e.g., homogeneity in willingness to pay, competitive conditions, cost, etc. Such 
practice is widely known as price discrimination which can be defined as selling the 
same product to different customers at different prices even if the cost of sale is the 
same to each other (Posner, 2001). 
Concerning the prospective consumers’ reaction to the launch of NGA-based services, 
it is expected that there will be a significant variation among consumers’ willingness 
to pay for the additional benefits of such enhanced services. This implies that some 
end-users, which have low willingness to pay, will still buy the basic “universal-level” 
service only, while some others have higher valuation for advanced bandwidth-
hungry services, and hence, will migrate to the NGA networks. The main take-away 
of the relevant studies (Flamm and Chaudhuri, 2007; Preston et al., 2007) is that 
consumers who place a higher (lower) valuation to broadband subscription tend to 
live in higher (lower) densely populated areas. Under a geographic price 
discrimination perspective the operator could exploit such information and be able to 
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price-discriminate in order to reflect more closely retail consumers’ willingness to pay 
(“value-based” pricing) and/or geographical differences in network costs. 
Academic research points out that price discrimination increases producer surplus 
while the outcomes on consumer surplus and social welfare are heterogeneous. Varian 
(1985) shows that a necessary condition for price discrimination to improve welfare is 
that output increases. More recent articles study the impact of price discrimination not 
only on welfare outcomes, but also on a monopolist’s investment incentives. In 
particular, these recent articles study the impact of price discrimination on the level of 
investment in quality (Alexandrov and Deb, 2012; Valletti, 2006). In both articles the 
number of the markets that the quality-enhanced product will be sold is exogenously 
defined, whereas the investment in quality is endogenously derived. It is found that 
price discrimination results in more investment in quality than uniform pricing, 
whereas its impact on social welfare depends on the specific underlying industry 
characteristics. 
Contrary to the above-mentioned articles, this paper studies the impact of price 
discrimination on the geographic level of NGA deployment chosen by a monopolist. 
This implies that the quality of an NGA-based service is exogenously defined (e.g., 
FTTH), whereas the number of geographic areas (markets) that this service will be 
provided is endogenously chosen. It is found that that geographic price discrimination 
provides the monopolist with higher incentives to deploy a larger NGA network. In 
addition, geographic price discrimination results in better welfare outcomes than 
uniform pricing as long as the investment cost is not extremely low. The policy 
implication from these results is that an unregulated monopolist will choose the 
socially optimal pricing regime as long as the investment cost is not extremely low.  
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 compares 
two pricing regimes, differential and uniform pricing, in terms of investment 
incentives and the subsequent social welfare level. The last section summarizes the 
main results of this article and proposes the directions for future work. 
 
2. The model 
Assume a hypothetical country consisting of different geographic areas which can be 
indexed in a decreasing order according to their population density. In particular, 
geographic areas are indexed by i  with [1, ]i n , where low values of i  imply 
geographic areas with high population density, whereas geographic areas that are 
indexed by i  close to n  represent rural areas (i.e., with low population density). A 
monopolist provides a basic “universal-level” broadband service (e.g., ADSL) to all 
geographic areas at a uniform price. 
Now assume that the monopolist invests in access network upgrade in order to 
provide a certain ultra-fast NGA-based service to the consumers (i.e., FTTH). The 
monopolist determines the geographic extent of the NGA deployment denoted by 
[1, ]x n . A larger x  reflects a fibre deployment to less densely populated geographic 
areas. The monopolist faces a quadratic NGA investment cost with respect to x , 
given by  
2
( ) / 2c x φx . The parameter > 0φ  represents the slope of the marginal 
investment cost function, and hence, higher values of  φ  imply a higher investment 
cost for a given investment level. The convex form reflects the fact that fibre 
deployment becomes marginally more expensive as it is extended to rural, less 
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densely populated areas. It is further assumed that the NGA investment level does not 
have any impact on the marginal cost of providing the NGA-based service. Thus, the 
unit costs of production and distribution are set to zero. 
In addition, the NGA deployment positively affects the willingness to pay of all 
consumers e.g., due to the emerging positive network effects. However, as it has 
already been noted in the introduction section, the consumers who live in more 
densely populated areas place a higher valuation to the additional benefits stemming 
from the NGA-based services than the consumers who live in less densely populated 
areas. In particular, it is assumed that the impact of the NGA deployment on the 
consumers’ willingness to pay is given by x / i
2( ) . Therefore, the demand function in 
each geographic area i  is given by: 
2
i i
A x / iq p                                         (1) 
where 
ip  and iq  are the retail market price and the quantity supplied by the 
monopolist, respectively, in each geographic area. The parameter A  represents the 
point at which the inverse demand function, 2
i i
A x / ip q   , intersects the vertical 
(price) axis when no investments have taken place. This implies that A  represents the 
maximum valuation that the consumers place to the basic “universal-level” service, 
which affects the overall valuation for this service. As a result, the profit function of 
the monopolist in each geographic area is given by: 
2( )i i iA x / ip p                                      (2) 
whereas, the total profits of the monopolist are given by: 
2 2
1
( ) ( / 2)    
x
i i
A x / i di xp p                              (3) 
A two-stage game is considered. In the first stage, the monopolist determines the 
extent of the NGA deployment, whereas in the second stage, it provides the 
exogenously determined quality of the NGA-based service in the geographic areas 
where the NGA network has been deployed and sets the price(s) according to the 
chosen pricing regime. In particular, there are two possible pricing regimes. Under the 
first pricing regime, the monopolist sets a different retail price to each geographic area 
(differential pricing) which reflects the different impact of the NGA deployment on 
the willingness to pay of the consumers who live in different geographic areas. 
According to the second one, the monopolist sets the same retail price (uniform 
pricing) to all geographic areas. 
 
3. Investment and welfare outcomes 
This section compares the two pricing regimes in terms of investment incentives and 
social welfare. In both cases, the game is solved backwards. This implies that in the 
second stage, the investment cost is sunk and the monopolist sets the price(s) of the 
ultra-fast broadband service for a given level of NGA deployment chosen in the first 
stage. 
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3.1. Differential pricing 
In each geographic area, the monopolist sets the retail price that maximizes its profits. 
Taking the first order condition of (2) with respect to
ip  yields the optimal regional 
retail prices as a function of the investment level x : 
22 2
i
A x
p
i
                                          (4) 
Substituting (4) into (1) gives the quantity demanded (number of subscribers) in each 
geographic area: 
22 2
i
A x
q
i
                                          (5) 
Therefore, the total profits of the monopolist and the consumer surplus are given, 
respectively, by: 
2 2
22 2
2
1
( 1)(3 6 1) / (12 ) ( / 2)
2 2 2


 
           
 

x
d A x xdi x A x Ax x x x x
i
        (6) 
2
2 2
1
( 1)(3 6 1) / (24 )
2
x
d iqCS di x A x Ax x x x                              (7) 
Taking the first order condition of (6) with respect to x  gives the optimal investment 
level chosen by the monopolist under price discrimination: 
2
23 9
d y yx v
z z v
                                          (8) 
where: 
23 6y A A                                          (9) 
12 2z                                            (10) 
1
32
3 6 3
1 1
3 2 3 3 2
y y y
v
z z z z z
 
       
           
        
 
                     (11) 
This investment level reflects the less densely populated geographic area which is 
passed by NGA network. Substituting (8) into (6) gives the monopolist’s profits from 
all NGA geographic areas passed ( d ), whereas consumer surplus ( dCS ) is derived 
by substituting (8) into (7). Social welfare ( dW ) is the unweighted sum of profits and 
consumer surplus. 
 
3.2. Uniform pricing 
In this pricing regime, the monopolist sets the same price, p , in each geographic area. 
This implies that the demand function in each geographic area i  is 2
i
A x / i pq    , 
and hence, the total demand faced by the monopolist is given by: 
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1
 ( 1)( 1 )
x
i
q di x A pq                               (12) 
Therefore, the total profits of the monopolist are given by: 
2 2
( / 2) ( 1)( 1 ) ( / 2)u pq p x A pφx φx                            (13) 
Taking the first order condition of (13) with respect to p  yields the optimal retail 
price: 
( 1) / 2p A                                       (14) 
As a result, the quantity demanded (number of subscribers) in each geographic area is 
given by: 
( 1)( 1) / 2
i
x Aq                                        (15) 
Therefore, the total profits of the monopolist and the consumer surplus are given, 
respectively, by: 
22( 1)( 1) / 4 ( / 2)u x A φx                                 (16) 
2
2 2
1
( 1)(3 6 4 5 4) / (24 )
2
      
x
u iqCS di x A x Ax x x x                 (17) 
Taking the first order condition of (16) with respect to x  yields the optimal 
investment level chosen by the monopolist under uniform pricing: 
2( 1)
4
u Ax



                                        (18) 
Substituting (18) into (16) gives the monopolist’s profits from all NGA geographic 
areas passed ( u ), whereas consumer surplus ( uCS ) is derived by substituting (18) 
into (17). Social welfare ( uW ) is the unweighted sum of profits and consumer surplus. 
 
3.3. Comparison of the pricing regimes 
This section compares the two pricing regimes in terms of investment incentives and 
social welfare. It is obvious that the complex form of (8), which gives the optimal 
investment level under differential pricing, makes the comparison of the investment 
levels derived by differential and uniform pricing extremely difficult without 
providing much critical appraisal. In addition, both the monopolist’s profits and 
consumer surplus are significantly affected by the chosen investment levels, and 
hence, the comparison of the social welfare levels under each pricing regime is also 
extremely difficult in a theoretical way. Thus, numerical simulations are used in order 
to compare the two pricing regimes in terms of investment incentives and social 
welfare. 
There are two independent parameters, A  and φ . Therefore, this paper studies the 
impact of such parameters on the effectiveness of each pricing regime to induce 
higher levels of both investments and social welfare. It is obvious that the study 
focuses on the range of the parameters that leads to non-negative profits for the 
monopolist under both regimes. In particular, differential pricing leads to non-
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negative profits for 
dd
    , whereas, under uniform pricing, the monopolist’s 
profits are non-negative for 
u
  . These critical values of φ  are affected by a 
change in A  according to the following Table.  
Table 1. The critical values of φ  for different values of  A  
A 
d
  
d
  
u
  
xφ  Wφ  
5 0.605 8.469 4.500 9.045 0.878 
10 0.589 29.740 15.125 30.424 0.868 
15 0.586 63.490 32.000 63.071 0.866 
20 0.584 109.740 55.125 110.865 0.865 
25 0.584 168.490 84.500 172.419 0.865 
30 0.584 239.740 120.125 236.401 0.865 
It is obvious that 
u d
  for all values of A , and hence, the range that leads the 
monopolist to earn non-negative profits under both pricing regimes is 
ud
    . 
Figure 1 shows the impact of A  and φ  on the investment levels undertaken by the 
monopolist under each pricing regime for 5A  , 10A  , 15A   and 20A  .  
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Figure 1. The levels of NGA deployment under differential and uniform pricing as a function of φ  for 
different values of A  
From figure 1 it can be deduced that for any given value of A , an increase in φ  leads 
the monopolist to undertake a lower NGA deployment either under differential or 
uniform pricing regime. This implies that as the investment cost increases, the 
monopolist has lower incentives to invest in NGA networks. In addition, an increase 
in A  shifts the investment function upwards, which implies that, given a particular 
investment cost parameter φ , higher valuation for the basic “universal-level” 
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broadband service leads to higher investment levels. It is thus obvious that an increase 
in φ  negatively affects both investment levels, whereas an increase in A  positively 
affects the monopolist’s investment incentives. Not surprisingly, the monopolist has 
higher incentives to deploy a larger NGA network for low investment cost and high 
valuation for the basic “universal-level” broadband service.  
Concerning the impact of A  and φ  on the effectiveness of each pricing regime to 
induce higher investment level, simulations show that differential pricing leads to 
higher investment level than uniform pricing as long as xφ φ . When xφ= φ , the two 
pricing regimes result in the same outcome in terms of NGA deployment (i.e., 
d ux x ). Table 1 also provides the values of xφ  for different values of A . It is 
obvious that xφ  is always higher than the upper limit of  φ  (denoted by 
u
 ) that 
makes the monopolist earn non-negative profits under both pricing regime. Therefore, 
the following proposition can be stated: 
Proposition 1. For any admissible values of A  and φ , differential pricing always 
results in higher investment levels than uniform pricing (i.e., d ux x ). 
The main regulatory implication stemming from the above proposition is that the 
regulator should allow the monopolist to geographically price discriminate if its 
unique purpose is to promote investments in NGA networks. However, the goal of 
regulators is not only to encourage NGA investments but also to prevent the 
monopolist from exploiting its market power to the detriment of consumers. In other 
words, the regulator should allow the monopolist to geographically price discriminate 
if such regime results in better outcomes than uniform pricing in terms of both 
investment incentives and social welfare. Figure 2 shows the impact of A  and φ  on 
the subsequent social welfare levels derived by the monopolist’s optimal investment 
choice under each pricing regime for 5A  , 10A  , 15A   and 20A  .  
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Figure 2. The levels of social welfare under differential and uniform pricing as a function of φ  for 
different values of A  
It is obvious that the behavior of the welfare functions is similar to that of 
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investments. In particular, an increase in A  has a positive impact on the welfare 
levels derived by both pricing regimes, whereas an increase in the investment cost φ  
negatively affects the social welfare outcomes. Concerning the comparison between 
the derived social welfare levels under each pricing regime, simulations show that 
differential pricing leads to better welfare outcomes than uniform pricing as long as 
Wφ> φ . On the contrary, when Wφ φ , the socially optimal pricing regime is that of 
uniform pricing. Therefore, for every value of A , there is a critical value of  φ  
denoted by Wφ  that makes d uW W .  This fact is clearly depicted in figure 2, 
whereas Table 1 provides the particular values of Wφ  for different values of A .  
Note that the values of  Wφ  are very close to that of 
d
 implying that there is a very 
limited range of φ  that makes u dW W  hold.  In other words, when 
d Wφ   , 
uniform pricing is the socially optimal pricing regime. In this case, there is a trade-off 
between encouraging the monopolist to deploy a larger NGA network and preventing 
the monopolist from exploiting its market power. However, when Wφ , differential 
pricing leads to better outcomes than uniform pricing in terms of both investments 
and social welfare. Given that the particular value of Wφ is rather low and the range of  
φ  that makes u dW W  hold is rather limited, the following proposition can be stated: 
Proposition 2. The regulator should allow the monopolist to geographically price 
discriminate as long as the investment cost is not extremely low. 
As a result, geographic price discrimination in NGA markets should be allowed by the 
regulator when the investment cost is not extremely low. In this case, the monopolist 
will price the NGA-based services according to the socially optimal pricing regime, 
which is the differential pricing. On the contrary, when the investment cost is 
extremely low (i.e., 
d Wφ   ), there is a trade-off between encouraging 
investments and promoting social welfare. In this case, the regulator may oblige a 
uniform pricing in order to improve social welfare since investments in access 
infrastructures may have already been encouraged by allowing the monopolist to ban 
access to the new NGA infrastructures by alternative operators (these are the cases of 
regulatory forbearance or regulatory holidays).  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper discussed the impact of retail price discrimination on investment 
incentives and social welfare when the investor is not obliged to provide access to its 
improved access infrastructures to its competitors. In particular, it was assumed that 
the firm invests in NGA networks under regulatory forbearance or regulatory holiday. 
Thus, the investor firm acts as a monopolist in the market for ultra-fast broadband 
services provided over the new fibre-based access network. It was further assumed 
that the consumers place a different valuation to the ultra-fast broadband connection 
according to their geographic area. In particular, consumers who live in more densely 
populated areas place a higher valuation to the ultra-fast broadband service due to 
socioeconomic characteristics, such as income, education, etc. 
It was found that geographic price discrimination provides the monopolist with higher 
incentives to deploy a larger NGA network (i.e., the NGA investment is extended to 
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rural, less densely populated areas). In addition, geographic price discrimination 
results in better welfare outcomes than uniform pricing as long as the investment cost 
is not extremely low. In such cases, the regulator should allow the monopolist to 
geographically price discriminate since the monopolist chooses the socially optimal 
pricing regime. On the contrary, when the investment cost is extremely low, uniform 
pricing is the socially optimal pricing regime, whereas differential pricing maximizes 
private investment incentives. In such cases, a benevolent regulator may impose the 
uniform pricing regime in order to mitigate the detrimental impact of regulatory 
forbearance or holidays on social welfare. 
Although its limitations, this paper provided some very interesting results concerning 
the regulation of the retail NGA market. However, since the focus of regulators is 
continuously shifting from the regulation of the retail market to the regulation of the 
wholesale market, this paper can trigger a discussion on the investment and welfare 
outcomes of geographic price discrimination at a wholesale level. Thus, future 
research should focus on improving this paper by introducing competition both for 
investments and consumers, and then, studying the regulatory implications of a 
geographic differentiated access price. 
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